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The articles made available to the reader in this theme 
section of História da Historiografia constitute the second 
moment of our attempt to answer a question presented as 
a thematic symposium proposed and organized by Kalle 
Pihlainen at the IV Congreso Internacional de Filosofía de la 
Historia in Buenos Aires in November 2017: “What makes 
history personal?” While ensuing discussions have continued 
on several fronts, the authors who now publish here — with 
the exception of the organizers of this section — are not the 
same who presented in Buenos Aires two years ago. In the 
intervening time, and through our evolving discussion, we 
have seen that the question is amenable to a wide range of 
responses and attracts attention on diverse fronts.
Given the range and variety of potential, relevant opinions 
and proposals, we have not attempted to definitively systematize 
or answer the question here — as if that were conceivable in 
any such endeavor — but to leave it, instead, to be rehearsed, 
tested, and experimented on by each contributor in the ways 
they see best. With this, we intend our theme section to shed 
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light on possible approaches to the question of the personal 
from theoretical viewpoints and concrete situations with distinct 
provenances.
One cannot seek an answer to the question of the 
personal nature of history without elaborating on the role 
emotions play on an elementary factor of intellectual life, 
namely, the research. Thus, by addressing the specific case 
of A.T., a young Finnish PhD candidate at the beginning 
of the 20th century, Marja Jalava’s article paves the way for 
broader identification too: reports of problems in carrying out 
research are common, yet details of any difficulties tend to be 
absent from the final work and hence easily remain unseen. 
However, with the lack of academic and institutional space to 
elaborate on the emotions involved, more sensitive researchers 
may reveal their distress in private and informal settings. Jalava 
does not miss the opportunity to point out how extremely 
manly that attitude is: to hide the suffering, to withstand the 
pain. After all, “boys don’t cry.”
Jalava studies the case of young A.T. because it shows not 
only how emotions occupy the realm of academic work but also 
how they contribute to it and, importantly, how the process 
of historical research in its elaboration is not merely a case of 
the historian expressing his or her feelings but, rather, their 
development in relation to others (in A.T.’s case, this is evident 
from his correspondence with an established Finnish historian 
of the time, Gunnar Suolahti). In this sense, there is no “self” 
prior to the work, but a “self” constructed (and also destroyed) 
throughout the process, always in a context — real or fictitious 
— filled by the expectations of others as well as by broader 
social and political meanings and significance.
To ignore the complexity of this setting would reiterate 
a radically dichotomic conception of knowledge, whereas 
recourse to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology offers Jalava a 
rich alternative to think on the young A.T, in whose trajectory 
one senses the presence of something each of us has witnessed 
in academia, whether personally, with colleagues or with young 
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students: the urgent need to give meaning to what one does 
(in A.T.’s case, this materializes in the national sentiment, 
strongly related to a feeling of manly brotherhood, a “band of 
brothers”), but to also be able to channel this in a specialized, 
“controllable” and scientifically rigorous way. Transference is 
not always easy and, when it does not occur, or when one does 
not know how to handle its failure, the psychological burden is 
strong (and we would do well to question whether we currently 
possess more sophisticated tools than those available to young 
A.T.). The complexity of the case is undeniable: empathy exists 
between two men, as exists the initial empathy between a young 
22-year-old and his research subject, in which, instead, he sees 
the reflection of the empathy for his national community. In 
such a vertiginous game of mirrors, A.T.’s self-image shatters. 
This was definitely not the first time and, sadly, it will not be 
the last.
Kalle Pihlainen’s article also aims to escape dichotomies, 
although, here, the key dichotomy is one that appears to 
have deep roots in debates within theory of history, namely 
that between experience and linguistic construction, presence 
and meaning, theory of history and its surroundings—all 
contrapositions that point to the need to overcome the mind–
body opposition. For Pihlainen, this attempt involves three 
questions: “How does language ‘embody’ reality?”, “How 
do referential texts encode reality?”, and, “How do we read 
referential texts with respect to reality?” Naturally, the reader 
will be able to follow how these unfold while reading the 
argument, but we can already highlight its most important 
nodes: body, codification, and identification. It is positively 
surprising to see how—both in Jalava’s and Pihlainen’s articles—
the same considerations appear and disappear, as if variations 
on a theme in which the body as a place (much more than as 
an object) of production of knowledge is central.
By proposing these three questions and seeking a way 
beyond easy polarizations, Pihlainen also invites the reader 
to think about several other concerns, two of which we wish 
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to highlight here. Firstly, the challenge to avoid intellectual 
voluntarism. Accordingly, the resources culturally present and 
used in the production of meaningful historical knowledge 
should not be understood as simple pliant instruments, but, 
instead, as a legacy one possesses, and one that can be better 
or less well known. Secondly, relatedly, the phenomenological 
basis underlying this thought process needs emphasis: after 
all, how should we ask “What makes history personal?” if we 
accept Merleau-Ponty’s assumption that we are “condemned 
to meaning”? This is a subtle question: to be condemned to 
meaning does not mean to be condemned by meaning. This 
phenomenological sensibility should also be seen as central to 
the reading process, as existing within the complex shuttling 
between reader and (referential) text, in which the identification 
between oneself and another is complex, gifted with meaning, 
and to be described in terms of “some kind of empathy” — that 
is, it cannot be a mere absorption of information that  questions 
the identity of readers and their reading methods, and nor can 
it constitute complete immersion. In this sense, the complex 
dynamics of what in Jalava’s text focus on the elaboration of 
a relational self are discussed by Pihlainen in ways that blur 
the often clearly drawn lines between body and mind (verbally 
articulated language), experience and language, and the 
reader’s present and the past represented in a historiographical 
piece.
Pedro Caldas’ reflection similarly demonstrates a concern 
for thinking the self beyond personalism, voluntarism and a 
self-centered subject-perspective. Using the subject pronoun 
“I” in most of his text, that is, assuming his own voice, which 
slowly looks for conceptual references — and articulates, 
therefore, both experience and meaning — Caldas begins 
with current experiences relating to a phenomenon yet to 
be classified in Brazil (and, unfortunately, not only in Brazil): 
the rise of far-right politics. It is as if his piece is traversed by 
the problem “How to personalize history without it being self-
centered?” Pihlainen’s expression could be usefully repeated 
in this context: “some kind of empathy”; and here we talk 
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about a delicate and difficult empathy between professionalism 
and an agitated, yet not always conventional everyday life, 
between professors and students, between the past and the 
present, told and endured by an author as relevant as Primo 
Levi, irreplaceable interlocutor, yet formulator of an experience 
contiguous to suffering that requires caution as to avoid 
immediate “immersion” (to use a term from Pihlainen’s piece 
again). Anguish can, therefore, be a putative pathos from 
which we see ourselves forced to lend meaning to history, 
so much so that another possible answer — one yet to be 
developed and one which remains inconclusive in Caldas’ text 
— would be to consider the personal nature of history when it is 
unheimlich (uncanny). Here, we are faced with an undoubtedly 
ironic situation since “-heim” carries within it the intimate, the 
welcoming, and the personal.
This engaging theme, laterally considered in Caldas’ text, 
is discussed by Jonas Ahlskog in a more conceptual manner. 
In his article, Ahlskog, too, aims to surpass key dichotomies: 
between the practical past and the historical past, between the 
experienced and the elaborated, between the will to engage in 
the present while already engaged with the past. His goal is 
clear: “In opposition, this essay argues that the personal resides 
within and not only beyond historical relations to the past.” The 
very choice of authors discussed by Ahlskog suggests the need 
to overcome this particular dichotomy: the combination of W. 
G. Sebald’s contemporary classic Austerlitz with the theoretical 
work of R. G. Collingwood highlights how important it is to 
articulate texts of distinct kinds.
With his reading of Austerlitz, Ahlskog shows how the 
investigative method is not just a tool but, also, something 
without which the personality of those who investigate would 
remain indistinct and unaffected. Obviously, Ahlskog knows 
that Austerlitz discusses a 20th-century traumatic event, yet he 
recognizes that it questions the radical dichotomy between those 
who suffer and those who study: “the best way of thinking about 
this contingency is probably to view it as scale without either of 
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the extremes — there is neither complete lack nor necessary 
connections with a personal dimension from the perspective 
of the individual.” Thus, a theme traced by Pihlainen, namely 
the reader’s importance in the process of personal construction 
of meaning, also potentially personal, follows, at Ahlskog’s 
hands, other contours. For him, the matter becomes one of 
how reflection on a book such as Austerlitz causes readers to 
see themselves as having a share of responsibility. One could 
ask: condemned in what way? — to generate ‘“some kind of 
empathy”?
Clearly, Collingwood is an essential point of reference 
for thinking about this question. As demonstrated so well by 
Ahlskog, the attempt to separate self-identity from everything 
else that one is always already immersed in offers shaky 
grounds to construct historical knowledge. One would be 
vehemently attacked for even positing such a dichotomy; and, 
more importantly, when undertaking to re-enact, it is clear 
that one not only gains the existential consciousness of seeing 
oneself obliged to attribute meaning but also needs the ethics 
of distinguishing oneself from — and, if that is the case, also of 
identifying with — the past ways of thinking that are being re-
enacted. Collingwood’s approach offers, as Ahlskog proposes, 
another possibility to consider the personal dimension of history 
in terms of a relational structure.
As noted, various points of entry and perspectives relating 
to all of these themes appear and reappear with distinct 
intensities throughout the articles that follow. Although 
this offering can only hint at the range of possible ways to 
articulate a response to “What makes history personal?”, 
some central questions have already been exposed: 
How to overcome the dichotomy between experience and 
language, between body and mind, between past and 
present, between engaging and disengaging, that is, between 
practice and theory? And, for example, in what measure do 
documents, such as letters and witness literature, provide 
routes to elaborate these questions? Or, in this pursuit, how 
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could turning to phenomenology help? Perhaps beginning with 
a phenomenology capable of critically implicating the reader, 
of creating “some kind of empathy”, first, hopefully, with the 
readers of this theme section.
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